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This article observes that American society’s passion for intercollegiate sports 
competition is an extremely powerful, naturally evolved cultural force. The mar-
ketplace responds to cultural forces, and the commercialization of college sports 
directly reflects the marketplace realities of our society. For example, colleges 
and universities rationally use their intercollegiate athletic programs, particularly 
NCAA Division 1 FBS football and basketball, as a means to achieve a wide 
range of legitimate objectives of higher education. Thus, the authors advocate 
that university athletic department revenues should continue to be exempt from 
federal taxation, specifically the unrelated business income tax (UBIT), despite the 
increasingly commercialized nature of intercollegiate sports. However, the com-
mercialization of intercollegiate athletics creates the potential for conflict with a 
university’s academic mission and the risk that student-athletes may be exploited. 
The authors propose that Congress provide the NCAA and its member universi-
ties with a limited exemption from the federal antitrust laws conditioned upon 
targeted reforms that will 1) ensure that intercollegiate athletics are primarily an 
educational endeavor; 2) better enable student-athletes in revenue-generating sports 
to obtain the benefit of their bargain; and 3) protect and maintain student-athletes’ 
intercollegiate athletics participation opportunities in nonrevenue generating sports.
This article begins by exploring our society’s powerful, naturally evolved 
passion for intercollegiate sports competition, the historical evolution of this cul-
tural phenomenon, and the role of intercollegiate athletics within the 21st century 
American university along with criticisms of the commercialized model that is 
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prevalent today. The United States marketplace responds to cultural forces and 
strong public demand for popular products; the commercialization of college sports 
directly reflects the marketplace realities of our society. For example, in response to 
substantial public interest in intercollegiate sports, particularly Division 1 Football 
Bowl Subdivision (FBS; formerly Division 1-A) football and men’s basketball, 
colleges and universities rationally invest substantial resources in their athletic 
departments, as a means to achieve a wide range of legitimate objectives that fur-
ther their missions: providing a lens through which the nature, scope, and quality 
of their higher educational services is discovered by the public; attracting faculty, 
students, and student-athletes; diversifying their student body; forging a continu-
ing bond with alumni, the local community, and other constituents that provides 
both tangible and intangible benefits; and enhancing their institutional reputations.
We then explain why university athletic department revenues should continue to 
be exempt from federal taxation, specifically the federal unrelated business income 
tax (UBIT), despite the increasingly commercialized nature of intercollegiate sports 
such as Division 1 FBS football and men’s basketball. Moreover, proposed revision 
of federal tax law is not an effective means of preventing marketplace forces from 
pushing intercollegiate athletics out of its proper role as an integral part of non-
profit higher education and into a primarily commercial endeavor nearly identical 
to for-profit professional sports.
Recognizing that the commercialization of intercollegiate athletics creates 
economic incentives for conduct that may conflict with a university’s academic 
mission and may potentially exploit student-athletes, we propose that Congress 
provide the National Collegiate Athletic Association and its member universities 
with a conditional exemption from the federal antitrust laws. This limited antitrust 
immunity would enable the NCAA to enact legislation to ensure that intercolle-
giate athletics is primarily an educational endeavor and to prevent the excessive 
allocation of university financial resources to sports as well as to better enable 
student-athletes in revenue generating sports to obtain the educational benefits of 
their bargain. In addition, our proposal has the potential to protect and maintain 
student-athletes’ intercollegiate athletics participation opportunities in sports that 
do not generate net revenues.
Commercialized Intercollegiate Athletics Reflects 
Cultural Forces and Marketplace Realities
The Psychological, Cultural, and Economic Underpinnings 
of Intercollegiate Athletics
The history of sport reveals underlying primal forces inherent in athletic com-
petition—humanity’s youthful energy and an inherent desire, based largely on 
an innate survival instinct, to compete with one’s fellows (Bonime, 1986). This 
evolved motivation, when combined with the symbiotic, often passionate relation-
ship between the athletic teams of a college or university and its broad variety of 
powerful constituencies, triggers a marketplace dynamic that reflects both basic 
human nature and its expression in American culture. The commercialization of 
intercollegiate athletics, which has steadily increased over time, is a natural response 
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to these cultural and market conditions that reflect human nature and the mindset 
of the leaders of American institutions of higher education.
Current neurology and psychology research indicates that human play is a joy-
producing essential activity of our species—an evolved, natural survival element 
inherent in humans (and certain other mammals) (Brown, S., 2009). Thus viewed, 
today’s mega-intercollegiate athletics did not begin with institutional athletic 
departments, high-priced coaching staffs, alumni supporters, Nike and other com-
mercial licensees, ESPN and other sports broadcasters, and Sports Illustrated and 
other media sources. Athletic competition is rooted deeper in us; it is part of the 
robustness of America’s settlers—for example, a youthful Abe Lincoln reportedly 
first gained notice for his strength and athletic ability in frontier Indiana wrestling 
contests (Norton, 2009; Beskow, 1987). This same primal energy is the source of 
intercollegiate sports competition; for example, the 1852 regatta between Harvard 
and Yale students, which was the first large scale intercollegiate athletics event 
among American universities (Davenport, 1999).
The long history of human athletic competition illustrates something funda-
mental about American character. Like psychologist-neurologist-researcher Stuart 
Brown, we might devote decades to studying play activities among the young 
(Brown, S., 2009). We would observe clusters of preschoolers romping together 
in public parks; stickballers on inner-city streets; hoopsters in every neighborhood 
scrambling for rebounds; kids’ racing on elementary school playgrounds; rural 
teens with gloves, mitts, and baseballs in grassy meadows every spring. We also 
would see prepubescent boys and girls competing as members of suburban teams 
in leagues from coast-to-coast as well as groups of ten-year-olds playing in Pop 
Warner football leagues. A powerful, elemental spark exists in youth that hungers 
for the adventure of athletic competition. Assuming this thirst for competition and 
choosing up sides—team loyalty—are closely linked, the mere existence of com-
petitive intercollegiate teams energizes enthusiasm among those who are spectators 
to the competition.
Regardless of how one views the existence of our competitive nature—whether 
you celebrate the individual drive to compete or condemn it as a barrier to a more 
utopian ideal based on sharing and cooperation—this seems clear: The presence 
of our primal competitive drive is not a contrivance by marketplace forces but, 
conversely, an evolved, natural survival element. As always, our culture reflects 
human needs for expression of our innate drives and, in a free market system, the 
marketplace responds to cultural demands and gives rise to commercialization. 
Intercollegiate athletics are a powerful example.
The Evolution of Commercialized College Sports: 
1852–Present
Historically, intercollegiate sports competition has never been insulated from 
the impact of American culture, both academic and general. Rather, it always 
has been an integral and representative part of our culture. Briefly reviewing the 
principal cycles in the evolution of American intercollegiate athletics will help to 
clarify this article’s central proposition: Elemental forces of human nature create 
cultural desires, which are quickly satisfied by the creation of products and services 
through the operation of a free marketplace. This ongoing dynamic creates powerful 
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economic forces with corresponding commercial incentives that create the potential 
for social and political conflicts as well as abuses. The evolution, growth, and 
commercialization of intercollegiate athletics—with the predictable conflicts and 
abuses—is a paradigmatic example of these cultural and marketplace phenomena 
in action (Davenport, 1999).
As a threshold matter, it is important to recognize that the nostalgic character-
ization of American intercollegiate sports as “amateur” athletic competition is not an 
accurate depiction of either historic or current reality. Athletic competition among 
American institutions of higher education was, from an early date, based on the 
British rhetoric of “amateurism.” The erroneous ideal of uncompensated competitive 
sport for its own sake, which purportedly was the nature of athletic competition 
in Ancient Greece, did not reflect reality because successful Greek athletes were 
paid substantial sums of money for their efforts (reportedly up to “ten years worth 
of wages”) (Shropshire, 1991). Nevertheless, this historically mistaken notion of 
“amateurism” became the hallmark of elite British universities such as Cambridge 
and Oxford and flourished by reason of English society’s rigid class distinctions 
and culture of elitism (Turano, 2009). The concept of “amateurism” has been a 
hypocrisy masking the reality of American interscholastic athletics from its earliest 
moments. It is notable that the first of this country’s intercollegiate sports rivalries 
arose in 1852 antebellum America with crew competitions between students from 
Harvard and Yale. Harvard rowing teams from the 1850s onward were known to 
participate for the payment of sums ranging from $100 to $500 (Shropshire, 1991).
Subsequent commonplace practices such as awarding athletic scholarships 
covering the costs of student-athletes’ tuition, room, board, and books that are 
worth thousands of dollars, hiring professional coaches (including multimillion 
dollar salaries for Division 1 FBS and men’s basketball teams) and athletic train-
ers, recruiting talented athletes, and generating multimillion dollar revenues from 
gate receipts, broadcast revenues, and sponsorships are notable features of the 
commercialization of American intercollegiate athletics, which belies the truth of 
its continuing self-characterization as “amateur” sports competition.
The pattern of competitive intercollegiate athletics since 1852 has been akin to 
the history of America itself. As part of the never-ending dynamics of human activ-
ity, athletic competitions between student groups from rival institutions of higher 
education became more commonplace. The first intercollegiate football game was 
played by teams of students from Rutgers and Princeton in 1869 (Kennedy, 2000). 
As in all things human, unintended negative side effects and problems inevitably 
arose. With the result that leaders of higher education institutions sought to jointly 
regulate football contests and other competitive student athletic activities, which 
were burgeoning in popularity. For example, to deal with violent brawls and other 
problems, the famed 1895 Chicago Meeting led to the formation of The Big Ten 
as the nation’s first major intercollegiate athletics conference (Davenport, 1999).
The next important landmark came in 1905 when serious college football 
injuries and deaths rocketed to epidemic proportions. President Theodore Roos-
evelt reacted by meeting with Ivy League institutions and demanded reform of 
football’s playing rules to remedy this problem (Alesia, 2006). In response, the 
representatives of sixty-two major institutions met to form the Athletic Association 
of the United States (AAUS), the predecessor to the National Collegiate Athletic 
Association (NCAA).
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During the 1920s intercollegiate athletics became formally recognized as part 
of higher education under the auspices of the NCAA (Carter, 2006). In this era 
the linkage between alumni and the institution—reflecting institutional thirst to 
obtain financial support from donors—became firmly tied to many universities’ 
intercollegiate sports programs. The market crash of 1929 coincided with the release 
of the Carnegie Report, which summarized the detailed findings of its multiyear 
project examining the nature of athletic competition and its relationship to college 
administrators arising from the sports boom of the 1920s (Davenport, 1999). The 
Carnegie Report documented “rampant professionalism, commercialization, and 
exploitation that were corrupting virtually all aspects of intercollegiate athletics” 
(Griffith, 1930). The litany of abuses identified in the Carnegie Report included the 
inordinate emphasis on intercollegiate sports competition on college campuses and 
failed university administrative oversight of football programs, plus particularized 
lists of many institution-specific bad practices. To remedy such abuses, the Carnegie 
Report called for reform to eliminate commercialization and professionalism in 
intercollegiate athletics (Savage, 1929). However, even during the general economic 
belt-tightening of the Great Depression, these problems continued largely unabated.
After the World War II interregnum came a rocketing resurgence of college 
sports—and the advent of national TV—as college athletic departments became 
sources of significant revenue. Money, usually tied to winning programs, became 
the driving force in athletic departments; recruiting abuses, basketball scandals, 
and other distressing events were rampant (Davenport, 1999). In response, the 
NCAA was transformed from an advisory body into a powerful national regula-
tory agency, which made rules, systematized policing of rules infractions, and 
imposed sanctions on its member institutions for rules violations (Smith, 2000). 
The NCAA was authorized by its member schools to censure, penalize, expel, and 
enforce sanctions against institutions for rules violations that contravene its basic 
objective “to maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational 
program and the athlete as an integral part of the student body and, by so doing, 
retain a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional 
sports” (NCAA Constitution, article 1.3.1).
For the past 60 years, the commercialization of intercollegiate sports has 
continued to grow, largely in response to the enormous popularity of Division 1 
FBS football and men’s basketball and the consequent multimillion dollar revenue 
generating potential of these sports. For instance, CBS agreed to pay the NCAA 
$6 billion from 2002 through 2013 to broadcast its men’s basketball tournament. 
A May 2009 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) paper titled “Tax Preferences for 
Collegiate Sports” states that the 2008 NCAA men’s basketball tournament gener-
ated approximately $143 million in revenue for college athletic departments and 
that FBS bowl games generated roughly the same amount (Congressional Budget 
Office, 2009). The CBO paper includes data showing that the 2004–05 fiscal year 
average athletic program revenues for universities with Division 1 FBS football 
and men’s basketball teams was $35.2 million.
According to a February 2009 study commissioned by the NCAA titled “The 
Empirical Effects of Collegiate Athletics: An Update Based on 2004-2007 Data,” 
Division 1 athletic departments with FBS football and men’s basketball teams 
increased their spending by an average of almost 10.7% annually from 2004 to 
07 with their annual revenues increasing by 10.6%, which evidences roughly a 
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one-for-one relationship between athletic expenditures and revenues (NCAA, 2009). 
(This increased spending on intercollegiate athletics was more than double the aver-
age 4.9% annual increase in these universities’ overall nonathletics spending during 
this time period.) The study also found data that supports the existence of an “arms 
race” (i.e., “a situation in which the athletic expenditures by a given school tend to 
increase along with expenditures by other schools in the same conference”) at this 
level of intercollegiate athletics competition. Although the annual salaries of many 
football and basketball coaches exceed $1 million, the study found no significant 
relationship between coaching salaries and the team’s winning percentage.
A report concerning the 2004–06 NCAA Revenues and Expenses of Division 
1 Intercollegiate Athletics Programs found that only 19 of 119 Division 1 FBS 
institutions generated revenues that exceeded their expenses in the 2006 fiscal year 
(NCAA, 2006). From 2004–06, only 16 institutions reported positive net revenues. 
For 2006 salaries for coaches (17%) and administrators (15%) accounted for 32% of 
total expenses. The 2006 median salary for basketball head coaches was $611,900 
(a 15% increase from the 2004 median); for football head coaches it was $855,500 
(a 47% increase from the 2004 median). Total athletic department spending is 
approximately 5% of total university expenses at median FBS institutions.
Role of Intercollegiate Athletics Within 21st Century 
American Universities and Academic Criticism 
of its Prevalent Commercial Model
At its core, the efforts of many college and university presidents to invigorate 
their campuses involves building their academic and research programs, attracting 
topnotch faculty and larger incoming classes of students with stronger academic 
credentials, generating more donations and bigger endowments, reconfiguring 
their institutional identities, and enhancing their institutions’ political clout. In 
an extremely competitive higher education market, academic leaders increasingly 
use intercollegiate sports as a catalyst and means to achieve these legitimate ends. 
This rational conduct on the part of university presidents and governing boards is 
merely a facet of competition in a well-functioning democratic society. This is a 
drive embedded in human nature and modern culture, which is embodied by the 
centuries’ old American enterprising spirit of doing what is necessary to compete 
successfully.
Regarding the similarities between intercollegiate athletics and higher educa-
tion, Sidney McPhee, the president of Middle Tennessee State University, explained: 
“Competition among institutions of higher education may be perceived as being 
confined to the playing field. It is not. While we tend to think of higher education as 
a homogeneous collection of colleges and universities, individually they are varied 
and aggressively competing with one another for resources, talent and standing. . . . 
Competition on the playing field as is higher education is a fundamental principle 
of a free-enterprise system” (NCAA, October 2006, p. 23).
Universities allocate funds to intercollegiate athletics based on their perceived 
institutional value, which is the same way resources are allocated to their academic 
programs and other activities. The most prominent features found in the following 
examples of institutional success stories (e.g., stronger faculty recruitment, larger 
student bodies with better academic credentials, more financial resources, statewide 
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political clout, etc., created in large part by devoting increased resources to intercol-
legiate athletics) all share one crucial commonality. University leaders perceived a 
symbiotic interdependence between a successful intercollegiate athletics program 
and institutional academic growth as an energizing reality in 21st century American 
higher education, and acted upon it (Morgan, 2007). This is the very same ladder 
to success by which many of the nation’s currently well-established universities 
(e.g., Notre Dame, Michigan, Ohio State, Minnesota, and the University of Southern 
California) ascended long ago (Sperber, 1993).
Academic leaders from Boise State University report that the football team’s 
recent national success has generated a huge increase in the university’s pool of 
admissions applications. Major gifts have flowed into the campus for new busi-
ness schools, nursing departments, and huge cash gifts from a prospering campus 
bookstore. In the past at funding time, the Idaho Legislature viewed Boise State as 
the fourth-best university in the state, but now recognizes it as “the first university 
people think of when they think of Idaho.” Merchandising contracts, bookstore 
profits, royalties from team name licensing, Nike jersey sales, and orders for game 
films have boomed. Officials believe that the energizing bounce to the school and 
to the community of Boise “will pay off for years” (Steeg, 2007).
A decade ago the University of South Florida, which was engaged in intense 
competition with the University of Florida, the University of Miami, and Florida 
State University for graduates of Florida high schools, studied its competitive 
situation and decided to take several steps to enhance the success and visibility 
of its intercollegiate athletics program, most notably football (Emerson, A., 2007; 
Thrash, R. 2007). USF President Judy Genshaft makes the point, accepted by 
college administrators for over a century, that a winning athletics program helps 
an institution in its efforts to recruit top faculty members and market its academic 
programs to prospective students. As a result, the University of South Florida 
has enjoyed phenomenal growth in its student body; in five years its enrollment 
increased from 39,000–45,000, now making it Florida’s third largest public uni-
versity. Moreover, increased applications have enabled USF to be more selective 
in its student admissions decisions.
Georgia State University (GSU) President Carl V. Patton believes that creating 
a competitive intercollegiate football program is “desirable if not close to manda-
tory” as the GSU campus transforms itself from a commuter school to an institution 
that provides a “full-rounded college education” (Lederman, 2008). According to 
Patton, what prospective GSU students mean when they want GSU to be a “‘real’ 
university. . . is a university that has successful sports programs and football is one 
of the things they want.” Patton found widespread support among GSU alumni, 
students, and staff for implementation of his strategy. GSU’s game plan included 
hiring Bill Curry, formerly the head coach at Alabama and Georgia Tech, to be the 
university’s first head football coach (Awtrey, 2008). Similarly, the University of 
Houston, in an effort to reconfigure itself into a more nuclear campus by shifting 
away from its historic commuter culture, is utilizing on-campus football games and 
a recent conference championship to generate an identity change.
NCAA member educational institutions outside of Division 1 have also relied 
on intercollegiate athletics as a means of revitalization or transformation. Adrian 
College, a moribund liberal arts college in Michigan, used intercollegiate athletics 
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to completely turn itself around in three years. Before 2005 Adrian’s administration 
and faculty despaired because of their slumping enrollment and campus malaise. 
They decided to use intercollegiate athletics as recruiting tool in an attempt to 
reverse the decline and “discovered the fountain of youth for small liberal arts 
colleges” (Sander, 2008). Since 2005 Adrian’s enrollment has surged 57% to its 
highest number (1,470) in twenty years and the academic caliber of students has 
shot up. Before 2005 Adrian had accepted 93% of its pool of 1,200 applicants. 
Since adopting its athletics-based student recruiting strategy, Adrian now accepts 
only 72% of the applicants from a nearly fourfold larger pool of 4,200 applications 
and reports that its student body has better academic credentials.
Roosevelt University, a private university in downtown Chicago, is restoring its 
intercollegiate athletics program after a nearly 20-year hiatus (Moltz, 2009). During 
the past decade the university has transitioned from a largely commuter institution 
with adult part-time students to a more residential school with an increasing number 
of full-time traditional-aged students, many of whom want the university to bring 
back intercollegiate athletics. With the approval of Roosevelt’s faculty, university 
administrators are embarking on a plan to create twelve sports teams (not includ-
ing football), to resume participating in intercollegiate athletics competition in fall 
2010, and to rejoin the National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics. After five 
years, Roosevelt plans to apply for admission to NCAA Division III.
The symbiotic linkage between a university’s athletic success and visibility 
and its overall prominence and broader interests generally seems better recognized 
and more accepted by university presidents than by faculty members. As always, 
today’s university chief executive officers must act amid the slings and arrows of 
critics. Ever since fierce intercollegiate football rivalries emerged in the late 19th 
century, with its accompanying flood of injuries and other problems, the existence 
of intercollegiate sports competition has been periodically challenged, often by 
clusters of university faculty members.
Critics view today’s commercialized intercollegiate athletic programs as a 
campus leviathan, which is fundamentally inimical to the core academic values of 
the institutions of higher education which house them. This sentiment is based on 
two underlying fallacies: 1) an assumption that American universities are some-
how capable of existing in isolation from the marketplace dynamics generated by 
powerful cultural forces; and 2) a failure to recognize and appreciate that intercol-
legiate athletics, despite steadily increasing commercialization, has been a part of 
American universities for more than 150 years.
Despite concern expressed by faculty members about a perceived unhealthy, 
parasitic linkage between intercollegiate athletics and institutions of higher edu-
cation, many universities have increased their student enrollments and alumni 
pride by promoting and achieving athletic success on the football field. The use of 
intercollegiate sports by university leaders—who must explore all options in an 
effort to increase the human, financial, and other resources needed by their institu-
tions, as part of their efforts to enable their respective institutions to flourish in an 
increasingly competitive higher education environment—is a rational response to 
marketplace realities. However, college and university presidents must not allow 
commercialized intercollegiate athletics to assume a role inconsistent with an 
institution of higher education’s core values and academic mission.
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University Athletic Department Revenues Should 
Remain Exempt From Federal Taxation
Some commentators have taken the position that the increasing commercialization 
of college and university athletic programs requires that federal tax laws pertaining 
to those programs should be reexamined and ultimately modified by Congress. 
Specifically, they argue that many intercollegiate athletic programs, particularly 
those with Division 1 FBS and men’s basketball teams, have become large and 
profitable businesses insufficiently related to education; as a result, they assert that 
Congress should reexamine whether college and university athletic programs, as 
well as the NCAA, should be entitled to exemption from federal taxation and/or 
from the federal unrelated business income tax (“UBIT”) (Morgan, 2007).
Federal Tax Exemption
Organizations described in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) are 
exempt from the federal income tax (I.R.C. §§ 501(a) and 501(c)(3)). Organizations 
qualifying for tax-exempt status also qualify under section 170 for deductibility by 
individual taxpayers of contributions made to such organizations (I.R.C. § 170). IRC 
section 501(c)(3) includes institutions which are organized and operated exclusively 
for a number of specified purposes, two of which are education and “foster[ing] 
national or international sports competition (but only if no part of its activities 
involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment)” (I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)).
To qualify for tax-exempt status, an organization must meet a number of 
requirements. First, its articles of organization must meet two requirements: (1) they 
must limit the purpose of the organization to one or more of the exempt purposes 
listed in section 501(c)(3) of the IRC; and (2) they must not expressly empower 
the organization to engage in activities which are not in furtherance of one or more 
of such exempt purposes, unless such activities are an insubstantial part of such 
organization’s activities as a whole (Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1)(i)). Second, 
the organization must be operated exclusively for one or more of the exempt pur-
poses listed in section 501(c)(3) of the IRC. It will be regarded as meeting this 
requirement if it engages primarily in activities which accomplish one or more of 
those purposes. It will not be so regarded if “more than an insubstantial part of its 
activities is not in furtherance of an exempt purpose” (Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-
1(c)(1)). An organization may operate a trade or business as a substantial part of 
its activities and yet meet the requirements of section 501(c)(3) if “the operation 
of such trade or business is in furtherance of the organization’s exempt purpose 
or purposes and if the organization is not organized for the primary purpose of 
carrying on an unrelated trade or business, as defined in section 513” of the IRC. 
Determining the primary purpose for which an organization is organized requires 
an examination of all the circumstances involved, “including the size and extent 
of the trade or business and the size and extent of the activities which are in fur-
therance of one or more exempt purposes” (Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(e)(1)). No 
serious argument has been made that the NCAA does not meet these requirements. 
Likewise, no serious argument has been made that any college or university does 
not meet these requirements because of its athletic program.
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Two other issues are potentially relevant with regard to whether a college or 
university operating an athletic program qualifies for tax-exempt status under sec-
tion 501(c)(3): the “private inurement” and “private benefit” limitations. Section 
501(c)(3) provides that “no part of the net earnings of [an exempt organization shall 
inure] to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual” (I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)). 
This language has been interpreted “as prohibiting a ‘siphoning off’ of the assets 
of an exempt organization to an insider.” This could occur by an exempt organiza-
tion paying an unreasonable salary to an insider, thereby paying more than fair 
market value for the services that the insider provided in exchange for such salary 
(Colombo, 2009 p. 12). The issue that has been occasionally debated with regard 
to college and university athletic programs is whether the compensation packages 
awarded to football and basketball coaches by some schools have become suf-
ficiently excessive so as to violate this limitation. Professor John Colombo argues 
persuasively that there is no real issue here, primarily because the Regulations allow 
reasonableness of compensation to be “measured by what the market is paying for 
similar services including the for-profit market.” This allows for the compensa-
tion of college coaches to be compared with the compensation of coaches in the 
professional leagues to determine what is reasonable (Colombo, 2009 p. 13). As a 
consequence, it has not been seriously argued that the tax exemption of a college 
or university is at risk under the private inurement limitation based on the amount 
of compensation it pays its coaches.
The Regulations pursuant to section 501(c)(3) provide that “it is necessary 
[to qualify for exemption] for an organization to establish that it is not organized 
or operated for the benefit of private interests such as designated individuals, . . . 
shareholders of the organization, or persons controlled directly or indirectly, by 
such private interests” (Treas. Reg. 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii)). These provisions have 
been interpreted to mean that “an organization can lose its exemption if, as a result 
of serving its charitable class, it confers an excessive benefit . . . on parties outside 
of the charitable class.” While this limitation seems somewhat similar to the private 
inurement limitation, “[t]he primary differences between [these two limitations] 
are that: (1) the private benefit doctrine can be applied to transactions with ‘out-
siders’ (that is, independent parties who have no influence over the charity); and 
(2) private benefit can apply even to transactions entered into at fair market value” 
(Colombo, 2009 p. 15).
The private benefit limitation has been described as “a quintessential balanc-
ing test in which the benefits to private individuals or organizations as a result of 
a particular activity must be weighed against the charitable benefits the activity 
produces.” If a transaction is structured such that it appears to excessively favor 
private interests, it will violate this limitation even though it also serves the chari-
table class (Colombo, 2009 p. 17).
The issue with regard to athletic programs of colleges and universities is 
whether those organizations, along with the NCAA, “provide excessive private 
benefit to television networks and the professional sports leagues in comparison 
to the educational benefits provided to the charitable class (e.g., the participating 
student-athletes)” (Colombo, 2009 p. 17–18). The argument is that the television 
networks receive substantial benefits in the form of profit when they televise college 
games, and the professional sports leagues receive substantial benefits by effectively 
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utilizing the colleges and universities as training and development programs and 
avoiding the cost of maintaining those programs directly (Colombo, 2009 p. 18).
Professor Colombo acknowledges that this argument “seems plausible given 
the extraordinarily broad scope of the private benefit doctrine,” but concludes that 
it seems highly unlikely to succeed” (Colombo, 2009 p. 18–19). He points out that 
the IRS has “never shown any inclination to apply the doctrine in this manner.” 
In addition, he asserts that “the NCAA can legitimately argue that it tries to keep 
its distance, and tries to distance college athletes, from the pro leagues, . . . [and 
reminds us that] the NCAA was not started by the professional sports leagues as a 
means of sloughing off their training costs to an exempt organization” (Colombo, 
2009 p. 18). Finally, he argues that the television contracts entered into by the 
NCAA seem fairly negotiated and there is no evidence that “the NCAA or universi-
ties negligently or intentionally ‘underpriced’ their product to give a bigger profit 
margin to the networks  . . .” (Colombo, 2009 p. 19).
In conclusion, it has not been seriously argued that because colleges and 
universities operate athletic programs they are not organizations described in sec-
tion 501(c)(3) of the IRC and are thus not exempt from the federal income tax, no 
matter how extensive and profitable those programs may be. Likewise, there has 
been no serious argument that the NCAA does not qualify for exemption under 
section 501(c)(3).
Unrelated Business Income Tax
Current Status of the Law
Before enactment of the UBIT in 1950, funds received by colleges and universities 
from any source were sheltered from taxation under the institution’s general tax 
exemption (Musselman, 2003 pp. 203–04). Until the UBIT was enacted, the law 
“recognized only two possibilities—an organization was either entirely taxable or 
entirely tax-exempt.” As a result, the courts generally treated activities conducted by 
colleges and universities as tax-exempt regardless of whether those activities were 
in any way related to the exempt purpose of the institution. This led colleges and 
universities to conclude that they could engage in business activities totally unre-
lated to their exempt purpose and enjoy a significant competitive advantage because 
their profits were exempt from tax. A famous example was New York University’s 
ownership of the C. F. Mueller Company, a leading macaroni producer. When the 
IRS attempted to tax the company’s profits, New York University successfully 
argued that the profits were exempt from taxation on the basis of its general tax 
exemption. Congress became concerned that the government was losing significant 
tax revenue from these business operations, and that business entities not owned 
by colleges and universities were suffering from unfair competition (Musselman, 
2003 p. 204). The ultimate result was enactment of the UBIT.
The UBIT imposes a tax, at rates applicable to taxable corporations, on the 
“unrelated business taxable income” (UBTI) of most tax-exempt organizations, 
including those described in section 501(c)(3) of the IRC (I.R.C. § 511(a); Mussel-
man, 2003 p. 204–05). In addition, public universities are specifically subjected to 
the UBIT (I.R.C. § 511(a)(2)(b)). UBTI is generally defined as the “gross income 
[of] any organization from any unrelated trade or business . . . regularly carried 
on by [such organization], less [certain] deductions allowed . . . which are directly 
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connected with the carrying on of such trade or business” (I.R.C. § 512(a)(1); 
Musselman, 2003 p. 205).
This definition requires the determination of three issues: (1) whether an activ-
ity is a trade or business; (2) whether it is regularly carried on; and (3) whether it 
is an unrelated trade or business. While each college or university athletic program 
would have to be examined on the basis of its particular facts, it is generally assumed 
by commentators that many college and university athletic programs constitute a 
trade or business because they seek profit (Musselman, 2003 p. 205; Jensen, 1987 
pp. 48–49; Kaplan, 1980 p. 1449).
The Regulations provide some guidance regarding whether an activity is regu-
larly carried on. It is generally assumed by commentators that athletic programs 
of colleges and universities are regularly carried on as the Regulations define that 
term (Musselman, 2003 pp. 206–07; Jensen, 1987 p. 50). The NCAA periodically 
engages in activities that undoubtedly constitute the conduct of a trade or busi-
ness, such as the NCAA basketball tournament held every year in March. It is also 
generally assumed that those business activities are regularly carried on within the 
meaning of the Regulations (Colombo, 2009 pp. 29–30; Musselman, 2003 p. 207; 
Jensen, 1987 pp. 48–49; Kaplan, 1980 pp. 1449–50).
In enacting the UBIT, Congress was intent on addressing its concerns stated 
above that colleges and universities conducting trades or businesses were able to 
deprive the government of significant tax revenue from those business operations, 
and enjoy an unfair competitive advantage over commercial business entities 
required to pay taxes on their income. Congress could have satisfied those concerns 
by providing that all trades or businesses conducted by exempt organizations would 
be subject to the income tax laws in the same manner as commercial business 
entities. Instead, Congress balanced those concerns against the basic policy for 
exempting certain organizations from the income tax by providing that an exempt 
organization would be taxed only on income from trades or businesses that are 
unrelated to its exempt purpose.
Whether an activity is an unrelated trade or business is a difficult issue and has in 
recent years become more controversial with regard to college and university athletic 
programs. The IRC defines an unrelated trade or business as “a trade or business 
[of a tax-exempt organization,] the conduct of which is not substantially related . . . 
to the [organization’s] exercise or performance . . . of its [exempt] . . . function” 
(I.R.C. § 513(a)). The Regulations provide that a trade or business is substantially 
related to an organization’s exempt purposes if “the production or distribution of the 
goods or the performance of the services from which the gross income is derived . . . 
contribute importantly to the accomplishment of those purposes.” Resolution of 
this issue “depends in each case upon the facts and circumstances involved” (Treas. 
Reg. § 1.513–1(d)(2)). An important factor is the “size and extent of the activities 
involved” in operating the trade or business compared with the “nature and extent 
of the exempt function which they purport to serve.” Thus, if the trade or business 
is “conducted on a larger scale than is reasonably necessary for performance of” 
the organization’s exempt functions, “the gross income attributable to that portion 
of the activities in excess of the needs of exempt functions constitutes gross income 
from the conduct of [an] unrelated trade or business” (Treas. Reg. § 1.513–1(d)(3)).
In Congressional hearings considering enactment of the UBIT, the House 
Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee both concluded 
that “income of an educational organization from [admission] to football games” 
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is not subject to the UBIT because “athletic activities of schools are substantially 
related to [the] educational functions” of those institutions (H.R. Rep. No. 2319, 
p. 409; S. Rep. No. 2375, p. 505). This language has essentially given colleges 
and universities a free pass under the UBIT with regard to their athletic programs 
(Musselman, 2003 p. 207; Jensen, 1987 p. 51). The IRS made a run at college 
athletics in 1977, asserting that revenue from the broadcasting rights to the Cotton 
Bowl football game were subject to the UBIT (Musselman, 2003 p. 207; Jensen, 
1987 p. 51 n.68). The IRS received a significantly negative reaction from the public 
to that attempt and responded in 1978, retracting its earlier position by issuing a 
series of unpublished National Office Technical Advice Memoranda discussing 
the close relationship of college athletics and education, and favorably comparing 
exhibition of a game in person with exhibition of a game on television to a much 
larger audience (Tech. Adv. Mem. 78–51–002; Tech. Adv. Mem. 78–51–004; Tech. 
Adv. Mem. 78–51–005; Tech. Adv. Mem. 78–51–006; Musselman, 2003 p. 207; 
Jensen, 1987 pp. 51–52 nn.68–69). In addition, the IRS issued two revenue rulings 
in 1980 consistent with its new position on this issue (Rev. Rul. 80–295; Rev. Rul. 
80–296), stating in one such ruling that “[a]n athletic program is considered to be 
an integral part of the educational process of a university, and activities providing 
necessary services to student athletes and coaches further the educational purposes 
of the university” (Rev. Rul. 80–296).
Should Congress Change the Law?
In spite of such stalwart support on the part of both Congress and the IRS for exemp-
tion from the UBIT of college and university athletic programs, some commenta-
tors assert that Congress should reexamine its conclusive statement that “athletic 
activities of schools are substantially related to [the] educational functions” of 
those institutions (Morgan, 2007). For example, Gabriel Morgan has argued that 
college and university athletic programs have become commercial enterprises that 
are independent of and detached from the institution, and have departed from the 
educational standards and values of the colleges and universities that sponsor them 
(p. 176). He believes that the extreme commerciality of these programs jeopardizes 
the education of the student-athletes and the financial security of the university, and 
that the programs “actually hinder the development of student-athletes’ academic 
capabilities in the quest for athletic victory and its accompanying revenue;” the 
best solution is to eliminate the Congressional presumption that college and uni-
versity athletic programs are substantially related to the educational purposes of 
those institutions (pp. 177–79). He offers three justifications for this proposition.
First, he asserts that there is no historical justification for any such presumption. 
He supports this assertion by citing to sources discussing the primal stages of 
American intercollegiate athletics in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
and their independence from the colleges and universities with which they were 
associated. In the beginning, college and university “administrations considered 
intercollegiate athletics wholly unrelated to a student’s academic pursuits” (p. 
179). It was not until the founding of the NCAA in the early twentieth century that 
colleges and universities asserted control over their athletic programs “by integrating 
them into newly created physical education departments,” and the purpose of that 
decision was not to establish a relationship between academics and athletics, but 
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rather to assert control over intercollegiate football and its “run-away violence” (p. 
180). This argument does nothing more than establish that American intercollegiate 
athletics began in the nineteenth century in a very primitive form and gradually 
evolved into its modern day structure. It is of no assistance in determining whether 
there should presently be a presumption that college and university athletic programs 
are substantially related to educational purposes.
Morgan’s second justification for eliminating the Congressional presumption is 
the commercialization of intercollegiate athletics and its focus on the generation of 
revenue. He believes such a focus “undermines the academic and financial integrity 
of both the athletic department and its university” (p. 181). He cites the introduc-
tion of television as the gateway that ultimately led to today’s multibillion dollar 
broadcasting contracts, multimillion dollar compensation packages for coaches, 
and the pressurized environment created by the need to remain competitive and 
maximize revenue, resulting in an overemphasis of athletic success and revenue 
and the devaluation of education (pp. 181–82).
This premise is the subject of much debate. University administrators assert 
that the success of university athletic programs translates to “increased applications 
to the university, superior student bodies, and increased alumni donations.” Morgan 
cites to studies that support “the notion that the success of a university’s athletic 
department causes an increase in applicants to the university,” but asserts that the 
data “failed to conclusively prove any relationship between athletic success and the 
academic quality of an incoming freshman class.” He concludes that “the notion 
that athletic success generates indirect educational value by increasing the quality of 
the student body is [thus] unsubstantiated.” One could also conclude from that data 
that the university administrators could perhaps be correct on that point. But even if 
there is no relationship whatsoever between a successful athletic program and the 
academic quality of an incoming class, increasing applications to the university by 
itself would constitute a significant achievement relating to the educational mission 
of the university. Colleges and universities constantly look for ways to increase 
their applicant pools for reasons other than increasing the academic statistics of the 
entering class; a common example would be to diversify a university’s student body. 
Morgan also cites to a letter written to Myles Brand, president of the NCAA, from 
Representative Bill Thomas, chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, 
for the proposition that the “federal government’s purpose in granting tax exemption 
to universities is to further education in general, not to increase the recognition, 
reputation or relative quality of one individual institution” (p. 183). That argument 
presumes the national applicant pool is finite and competition among colleges and 
universities for those applicants is a zero sum game. On the contrary, a much more 
logical presumption is that college and university athletic competition generally 
attracts a significant number of applicants with a high interest in athletics who 
would not otherwise be interested in attending college.
As to the assertion by university administrators that successful university ath-
letic programs result in increased alumni donations, Morgan cites to studies that 
have shown varying results; some “studies found no relationship between alumni 
donations and athletic success, others found a statistically significant relationship, 
and others found a relationship between athletic success and athletic donations” (p. 
184). But he concludes that whether there is in fact a correlation between success-
ful programs and increased donations is irrelevant because athletic programs are 
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not always successful and thus at times fail to attract a high level of donations; the 
result is that very few programs are profitable and “can have tangible and deleterious 
effects on the financial and educational interests of a university” (p. 184–85). If it is 
true that very few athletic programs are profitable, it is difficult to understand why 
subjecting college and university athletic programs to the UBIT will have any effect 
whatsoever on the manner in which such programs are conducted. But aside from 
that observation, it is not difficult to understand why a college or university would 
seek to maximize alumni donations from whatever source possible to further its 
educational goals. If increased donations are made to the university’s general fund, 
the educational benefits are obvious; but even if the increased donations are made 
only to the athletic programs, educational benefits to the university will result. As 
donations increase, the university will be able to increase the quality and breadth of 
the programs, resulting in an increase in the quality and reputation of the university.
The case studies described in this article are illustrative of the tremendous 
benefits, educational and otherwise, that colleges and universities have received by 
increasing the quality of their athletic programs; as discussed, such benefits include 
attracting high-quality faculty and students, generating donations and enrichment, 
reconfiguring their campus identities, and enhancing institutional political clout. 
Whether the athletic programs are profitable or not is of no consequence; there is 
no distinction between funding an athletic department and any other department 
of the university. A college or university, in its normal budgeting process, will 
allocate its resources based on each department’s need for funds, balanced against 
the institution’s overall objectives and goals.
Morgan’s third justification for eliminating the Congressional presumption 
is that the academic integrity of colleges and universities will be sacrificed “by 
recruiting, admitting, keeping eligible, and graduating talented athletes who are 
unqualified for the academic rigors of college-level curricula,” thereby undermin-
ing the educational purpose of the institution. (p. 186). In support of this premise, 
he cites to sources asserting that student-athletes are often recruited and admitted 
who do not satisfy the academic criteria established for students in general; that 
athletic departments have developed strategies to enable student-athletes to remain 
eligible in their sport in spite of their lack of motivation and academic ability; and 
that graduation rates for student-athletes are significantly below those for the student 
body as a whole. He asserts that these issues persist in spite of regulatory attempts 
at reform by the NCAA, and that they result in damage to “the intellectual ethos 
of a campus” and to “the educational goals of a university” (pp. 172–76 and 187).
Student-athletes are not the only group who are recruited and admitted with 
lower academic statistical qualifications, are the target of strategies designed to 
assist them in meeting academic performance standards as students, and graduate 
at lower rates than the student body as a whole. Admitting an entering class with 
the highest possible admission statistics is not the sole goal of a college admissions 
office. Every college and university, for example, allocates substantial resources to 
achieve and maintain a diverse student body, and virtually everyone would agree 
that accomplishing that goal significantly improves the educational environment of 
the institution. If athletic programs are in fact related to the educational purposes 
of colleges and universities, recruiting student-athletes to participate in such pro-
grams and assisting them in meeting academic performance standards would be 
appropriate activities in which colleges and universities should engage. Some of 
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the students who are recruited and admitted for the purpose of achieving a diverse 
student body would not have been given the opportunity to attend college if not 
for the diversity they bring to campus; likewise, some students would not be given 
the opportunity to attend college if they were not athletes.
Morgan suggests that nonathlete applicants who are more academically quali-
fied are rejected for admission so that athletically gifted student-athletes can be 
admitted, resulting in “the inefficient use of scarce academic resources” because 
the nonathlete applicants “would have taken greater advantage of the academic 
resources offered by the university” (p. 187). That is the same flawed argument 
used by opponents of diversity admissions programs. Academic statistics based on 
standardized test scores and high school grades are merely guidelines that college 
admissions offices use to predict how well a student may perform in college; many 
other factors contribute to a student’s ultimate performance, such as maturity level, 
hard work and determination, just to name a few. There are many examples of col-
lege students performing at a higher or lower level than their academic statistics 
would predict. In addition, if admissions were based solely on the basis of academic 
statistics, applicants who would be accepted in place of the student-athletes would 
have the lowest academic statistics in the entering class; even if academic statistics 
were perfectly predictive, which they are certainly not, those applicants would not 
perform significantly better than the student-athletes.
An additional weakness with Morgan’s third justification for eliminating the 
Congressional presumption is that it is largely based on assumptions and statistics 
with respect to which there is wide disagreement. For example, statistics compar-
ing the graduation rates of student-athletes with the student body as a whole have 
been hotly contested. In his response to Representative Bill Thomas, Myles Brand 
reported graduation rate statistics that were significantly different than those cited 
by Morgan, and he challenged the assumption that student-athletes do not satisfy 
the academic criteria established for students in general by asserting that Divi-
sion I scholarship student-athletes, on average, have higher SAT scores and high 
school grade point averages than college students as a whole (Brand, 2006 pp. 10 
and 12–13).
Morgan’s proposal is to eliminate the Congressional presumption that col-
lege and university athletic programs are substantially related to the educational 
purposes of those institutions, and to replace it with a case-by-case factual inquiry 
into whether an athletic program of a particular college or university is substan-
tially related to the educational purpose of the institution (Morgan, 2007 p. 189). 
He suggests factors that should be used to make that determination. First, he states 
that “the number, recency, and severity of NCAA or institutional rule infractions 
will be relevant” (p. 191). It is unclear exactly how rule infractions committed 
by an athletic program could be relevant in determining whether the program is 
substantially related to the educational purpose of the college or university, and he 
does not offer any explanation of that statement.
His second and third factors require comparing the academic performance and 
graduation rates of an athletic department’s student-athletes with those of the general 
student body (p. 191). He asserts that if the grade point averages and graduation 
rates of student-athletes are significantly lower than those of the student body as 
a whole, “it is unlikely that education is being enriched through participation in 
athletics” and the athletic departments of those institutions “are not contributing 
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importantly to the furtherance of education” (pp. 191–92). This conclusion sub-
stantially overstates the significance of academic performance of student-athletes 
to the question of whether a college or university’s athletic programs contribute 
importantly to the accomplishment of the institution’s educational purposes. As 
previously discussed, colleges and universities receive substantial benefits, educa-
tional and otherwise, from maintaining high-quality athletic programs. While the 
academic performance of an institution’s student-athletes is somewhat relevant to 
the relationship of its athletic programs to its educational purpose and mission, it 
is just one factor, no more or less important than the many others discussed above.
Morgan’s fourth suggested factor relates to a statement made in the Regulations 
with regard to determining whether a trade or business is substantially related to an 
organization’s exempt purposes: if the trade or business is “conducted on a larger 
scale than is reasonably necessary for performance of” the organization’s exempt 
functions, “the gross income attributable to that portion of the activities in excess 
of the needs of exempt functions constitutes gross income from the conduct of 
[an] unrelated trade or business” (Treas. Reg. § 1.513–1(d)(3)). He misapplies the 
Regulations by taking that sentence out of context to conclude that if an athletic 
program generates excessive profit it is being conducted on a larger scale than is 
reasonably necessary for performance of the college or university’s educational 
functions, and thus is not substantially related to the institution’s exempt purpose 
(Morgan, 2007 p. 192).
Morgan’s emphasis on an athletic program’s generation of profit in applying 
these Regulations is misguided; a more complete consideration of those Regula-
tions allows for an accurate analysis. The sentence in the Regulations immediately 
before the statement used by Morgan in his fourth factor states that in determining 
whether a trade or business is substantially related to an organization’s exempt 
purposes, an important factor is the “size and extent of the activities involved” 
in operating the trade or business compared with the “nature and extent of the 
exempt function which they purport to serve” (Treas. Reg. § 1.513–1(d)(3)). Next 
comes the statement used by Morgan: If the trade or business is “conducted on a 
larger scale than is reasonably necessary for performance of” the organization’s 
exempt functions, “the gross income attributable to that portion of the activities in 
excess of the needs of exempt functions constitutes gross income from the conduct 
of [an] unrelated trade or business” (Treas. Reg. § 1.513–1(d)(3)). The Regula-
tions are clearly discussing the activities involved in the trade or business, not the 
profit generated by such trade or business. The Regulations give no guidance on 
the question of when a trade or business would be considered to be conducted on 
a larger scale than is reasonably necessary for performance of the organization’s 
exempt functions. If athletic programs are in fact related to the educational pur-
poses of colleges and universities, it is difficult to imagine how the size and extent 
of the activities involved in conducting an athletic program could be greater than 
is reasonably necessary for performance of an institution’s educational function.
These recent appeals to Congress to subject college and university athletic 
programs to the UBIT appear in reality to be at best a cry for increased and more 
effective regulation of such programs by the NCAA, and at worst a red herring 
aimed at gaining leverage in a quest to diminish the ever-widening influence of 
intercollegiate athletics in the world of higher education. Morgan, for example, 
asserts that “the NCAA has neither the power nor the ability to directly regulate 
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the economic activities of its member institutions” (Morgan, 2007 p. 196). He 
argues that the threat of potential tax liability under the UBIT will incentivize 
athletic departments to recruit and admit student-athletes with adequate academic 
credentials, and insure that its student-athletes academically perform at a satisfactory 
level and graduate from the institution (pp. 195–96). The UBIT was never in any 
way intended to be a regulatory device for college or university athletic programs 
or for any other exempt organization; on the contrary, it was intended to address 
Congressional concerns that colleges and universities conducting trades or busi-
nesses were able to deprive the government of significant tax revenue from those 
business operations and to enjoy an unfair competitive advantage over commercial 
business entities required to pay taxes on their income. Moreover, the UBIT would 
be horrendously inefficient as a means of regulating those programs.
There is probably universal agreement that college and university athletic 
programs are in need of reform, and most would probably agree that the most 
competitive and profitable programs are in need of more effective regulation than 
they currently receive. But that falls far short of concluding that any programs 
currently in existence are not substantially related to the college or university’s 
educational purpose. It would be difficult to envision an athletic program that would 
be so devoid of educational value that it would not contribute importantly to the 
educational purpose of a college or university; for that to be the case, the athletic 
program would have to be conducted similar to a professional sports franchise, 
with virtually no regard given to education of its student-athletes. No athletic 
program would be allowed to go that far if appropriate and effective regulation is 
administered by the NCAA. Part III of this article proposes an alternative means 
of Congressional legislative reform to ensure that no college or university athletic 
program becomes so unrelated to the educational purposes of the institution that 
it would become subject to the UBIT.
Policy Analysis
A recent article by Professor John Colombo proposes a different approach. He agrees 
that the current state of the law precludes withdrawal of the “tax exemption from 
either the NCAA or the individual universities that conduct Division I football and 
basketball programs,” and it precludes application of the UBIT to the NCAA or to 
college and university athletic programs; in addition, he presents an insightful and 
well-documented argument that subjecting those institutions to the UBIT would 
make no difference, other than forcing them to incur significant additional expen-
ditures to comply with the law, because there would ultimately be no net revenue 
to tax (Colombo, 2009 pp. 27 and 36). The NCAA distributes all its net revenues 
to member schools; those distributions would likely be a deductible expense for 
tax purposes, leaving little or no unrelated business taxable income that would be 
subject to the UBIT even if Congress somehow changed the law to make the UBIT 
applicable to the NCAA (p. 37). Similarly, most athletic programs of colleges and 
universities are not profitable, and the few programs that currently show a profit do 
so in large part because those colleges and universities have no existing incentive to 
use rigorous cost accounting principles with respect to those programs; application 
of such principles would require proper allocation of costs to each athletic program 
for its share of capital expenditures for buildings and equipment, maintenance of 
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facilities, employee costs, and the like. Professor Colombo cites to James Shulman 
and William Bowen for their conclusion “that if capital costs are properly accounted 
for, no program would show an actual net profit for accounting purposes” (p. 38). 
In addition, if an individual program showed a profit even after proper application 
of cost accounting principles, it would not require very sophisticated tax planning 
methodologies to eliminate any unrelated business taxable income that might result. 
As aptly stated by Professor Colombo, “I doubt that the general counsel of, say, 
the University of Michigan would cower much in the face of a threat by the IRS 
to apply the UBIT to Michigan’s football program” (p. 39).
Despite Professor Colombo’s conclusions that the current state of the law 
precludes withdrawal of the tax exemption from the NCAA or college and univer-
sities conducting athletic programs, and precludes application of the UBIT to the 
NCAA or to those programs, and that subjecting those institutions to the UBIT 
would make no difference in any event because there would ultimately be no net 
revenue to tax, he nevertheless proposes that Congress change the law. He justifies 
his proposals by asserting that “big-time college athletics does not fit any of the 
theoretical explanations for tax exemption and does fit within the rationales for 
applying the UBIT[,]” and concludes that revenues from college and university 
athletic programs should thus be taxed as a matter of tax policy (p. 41).
Professor Colombo acknowledges that “there is no clearly-defined underlying 
theory for why we grant tax exemption to the broad range of organizations that claim 
charitable status[,]” but then discusses the various theories that have been offered 
over the years by academics and tax theorists to possibly justify such treatment 
and concludes that “big-time college athletics appears to fail under all of them.” 
The theories he discusses all make various assumptions: examples include the role 
charities should play in society; and behavioral characteristics of individuals, orga-
nizations and government and their responsiveness to various stimuli (pp. 41–43). 
Needless to say, the hypotheses posited by these theorists are highly speculative 
and subject to disagreement. In addition, Professor Colombo recognizes that under 
current law it makes no practical difference in any event whether any of these 
theories support tax exemption for college or university athletic programs because 
all such programs constitute only a relatively minor portion of the activities of the 
college or university operating them, and “tax-exemption is applied to entities, not 
to individual activities of entities” (p. 45).
As explained by Professor Colombo, “the UBIT was enacted precisely to handle 
this kind of situation: that is, to tax revenues from commercial activities undertaken 
by an otherwise exempt charity.” He describes the two principal justifications for 
adoption by Congress of the UBIT, as more fully discussed in Part II.B.1 of this 
article: “protecting the corporate tax base,” which he believes is the most important, 
and “avoiding ‘unfair competition’ between charities and for-profit service provid-
ers.” Regarding the latter, Colombo explains that “economists almost uniformly 
have rejected the notion that charities engage in ‘unfair competition,’ at least if 
one defines the term as some sort of predatory pricing or predatory market entry 
or expansion” (p. 46). He also describes two “policy concerns,” one of which is 
to limit “the extent to which the attention of charitable managers is diverted from 
their core charitable mission to for-profit empire building.” He asserts that “[g]iving 
Division I football and basketball revenues a pass under the UBIT clearly offends 
the corporate tax base protection and diversionary concerns . . .” (pp. 45-47).
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Professor Colombo recognizes that little or no tax revenue would be collected 
by subjecting college and university athletic programs to the UBIT because “it is 
likely that only a few of these programs would show a taxable profit after applying 
rigorous tax-accounting policies to their income and expenses.” As a result, it is 
difficult to understand how the corporate tax base could be at risk; but he insists that 
his point is nevertheless valid. He uses as an example the U.S. auto industry, and 
asserts that automakers should not receive a tax exemption simply because in recent 
years they have been unprofitable; “the theoretical tax base should include operations 
by auto manufacturers and the potential for future profit cannot be ignored” (p. 48 
n.155). But an industry that is unprofitable in some years and profitable in others 
is clearly distinguishable from college and university athletic programs which, as 
Professor Colombo readily admits, will never show a profit. As to his diversion-
ary concern, that theory is highly speculative and subject to disagreement. To the 
extent it has any validity, he fails to adequately explain how it is “offended” by 
current law. He baldly asserts that college and university athletic programs “may 
be the best example of how a significant commercial activity diverts the attention 
of charitable management from their core charitable program to the needs of the 
commercial business” (p. 48). To support this assertion, he argues that coaches are 
hired at increasingly exorbitant salaries to win games rather than provide education, 
substantial amounts of financial resources are spent on athletic training facilities 
and stadiums at the expense of the educational environment of the institution, and 
university administrators spend substantial amounts of time and money dealing 
with recruiting violations instead of educational endeavors. Those arguments are 
mostly conclusory and are subject to wide disagreement as previously discussed.
Based on his conclusions that “big-time college athletics does not fit any of 
the theoretical explanations for tax exemption and does fit within the rationales for 
applying the UBIT” (p. 41), Professor Colombo proposes three specific require-
ments Congress should impose on the NCAA or colleges and universities operating 
athletic programs: (1) Congress should “require that a certain percentage of revenues 
from revenue-producing sports such as football and basketball be used to expand 
nonrevenue athletic opportunities” (p. 51); (2) Congress should impose “targeted 
expenditure limits, such as capping coaches’ salaries or limiting annual expenditures 
on recruiting or sports facilities” (p. 53); and (3) Congress should require “both the 
NCAA and universities with athletic programs to provide detailed information both 
on the financial aspects of their programs using standardized accounting methods 
and on the academic progress of student-athletes” (p. 4).
Whether all or any of these proposed requirements merit adoption by Congress 
is certainly debatable, and they may well have positive effects from a policy stand-
point. Capping coaches’ salaries may violate current antitrust laws, as discussed 
in the next section of this article. But the question here is how adoption of these 
requirements has anything to do with tax law. The answer suggested by Professor 
Colombo is that federal tax law be used to enforce them. He suggests subjecting 
the NCAA or college and university athletic programs to the UBIT for violating 
these requirements; as he correctly concludes, those institutions can easily avoid 
showing a profit and will avoid paying any tax under the UBIT whether they are 
subject to it or not. Instead, he suggests that these new rules “be structured as 
requirements for continued tax exemption of the [college or university] operating 
the sports program” (p. 51). In other words, he recommends that if a college or 
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university violates these relatively minor rules that affect only its athletic programs 
it will lose its tax exemption applicable to the entire institution, an enforcement 
measure basically akin to capital punishment. Whether his proposed requirements 
are justified or not, they hardly merit such a draconian remedy.
Some of Professor Colombo’s proposals appear meritorious, but care must be 
taken not to swing the pendulum so far in the opposite direction as to unduly punish 
educational institutions by changing federal tax laws that may have unintended 
adverse consequences. Enforcement measures for any new regulations deemed 
necessary should be specific and appropriate to the harm caused by their breach. 
In addition, it would be a mistake to further burden and complicate federal tax 
laws with new requirements to be met by the NCAA and its member educational 
institutions, along with creating the potentially significant costs of federal agency 
enforcement, when targeted reform can more effectively achieve some of these 
objectives and others in an alternative manner.
 “Myles Brand Student-Athlete Education 
and Welfare Act”: Conditional Antitrust Immunity 
as an Effective Means of Implementing Targeted 
Reforms of Commercialized Intercollegiate Athletics
The commercialization of intercollegiate athletics in response to culturally-driven 
market forces is a largely irreversible trend, which is not necessarily socially 
undesirable because it can be used to further broader university academic objec-
tives. Some reform, however, is needed to ensure that the intercollegiate athletics 
are student-athlete centered and actually further the purpose of higher education, 
rather than functioning as a tail that wags the university dog or an anchor that 
inhibits fulfillment of its academic mission. In this section we propose that using 
the carrot of federal antitrust law immunity (rather than swinging the stick of 
threatened federal taxation of athletic department revenues) to implement targeted 
reforms to correct the most significant problems caused by the commercialization 
of intercollegiate athletics.
Historical Application of Antitrust Law to NCAA Regulation 
of Intercollegiate Athletics and Proposed Reform
According to the NCAA, “[s]tudent-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate 
sport, and their participation should be motivated primarily by education and by 
the physical, mental and social benefits to be derived. Student participation in 
intercollegiate athletics is an avocation, and student-athletes should be protected 
from exploitation by professional and commercial enterprises” (NCAA Manual, 
2008–09, Bylaw 2.9). Professor Davis has aptly characterized this idealized view of 
intercollegiate athletics espoused by the NCAA as the “amateur/education” model 
(Davis, T., 1994 p. 270) However, as previously discussed, true “amateurism” is 
nonexistent, especially today when many student-athletes receive “compensation” 
for participating in intercollegiate sports in the form of an economically valuable 
athletic scholarship that covers the costs of their college tuition, room, board, and 
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books. Nevertheless, this model may accurately encompass most intercollegiate 
athletics competition and student-athletes, particularly women’s and men’s sports 
that do not generate net revenues in excess of their production costs.
Those who participate in intercollegiate athletics are expected to strive for 
excellence in both academics and athletics, unlike professional athletes whose 
sole focus in on the later objective. Consistent with the educational component 
of the amateur/education model, student-athletes’ participation in intercollegiate 
athletics does in fact have several academic and future career benefits. Analysis of 
data from a 2007 National Collegiate Athletic Association study of 8,000 former 
student-athletes reveals that: 1) 88% of student-athletes earn their baccalaureate 
degrees (compared with less than 25% of the American adult population); 2) 91% 
of former Division 1 student-athletes are employed full-time (11% more than the 
general population), and on average, have higher income levels than nonstudent 
athletes; 3) 89% of former student-athletes believe the skills and values learned from 
participating in intercollegiate athletics helped them obtain their current employment 
in a career other than playing professional sports ; and 4) 27% of former Division 
1 student-athletes earn a postgraduate degree (Brown, 2007).
On the other hand, the “commercial/education” model, which “assumes that 
college sports is a commercial enterprise subject to the same economic consider-
ations as any other industry,” (Davis, T., 1994 p. 279) more accurately describes 
intercollegiate sports such as Division 1 FBS football and men’s basketball. Univer-
sities’ commercial exploitation of the entertainment value of these two enormously 
popular sports creates an inherent tension with their academic mission and the 
potential to overshadow or marginalize the educational aspects of intercollegiate 
athletics’. As former NCAA President Myles Brand observed: “there is rising 
concern that the values important to higher education have been overwhelmed by 
the popularity of intercollegiate athletics to media and marketing. As pressures to 
win and to generate revenue increase, the integration of athletics with the acad-
emy, the interference with presidential authority by avid fans or trustees, and the 
primacy of education in the student-athlete experience have all been threatened” 
(Brand, 2006 p.4).
NCAA rules that limit or regulate the commercial aspects of intercollegiate 
athletics currently are subject to the federal antitrust laws despite the nonprofit status 
of the NCAA and its member colleges and universities. The primary purpose of the 
antitrust laws is to preserve a competitive marketplace to ensure that consumers 
receive the benefits of economic competition. Joint agreements such as NCAA rules 
and regulatory activity that unreasonably restrain economic competition among 
its member universities or the intercollegiate athletics market violate antitrust law, 
specifically §1 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. §1).
In NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma (1984), the U.S. 
Supreme Court ruled that NCAA rules limiting the number of college football games 
that its members could televise annually was an output market restraint that violated 
the antitrust laws, thereby implicitly recognizing the existence of a commercial/
education model for some aspects of intercollegiate athletics. The Court established 
a “rule of reason” framework for determining whether a challenged NCAA rule is 
reasonable (i.e., legal) or unreasonable (i.e., illegal), which requires consideration 
and analysis of both its anticompetitive and procompetitive effects to determine 
its net economic effects on competition in the relevant market. It concluded that 
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jointly limiting the number of televised college football games below the level that 
would be supplied in a free market responsive to consumer demand has significant 
anticompetitive effects. This restraint did not further a legitimate procompetitive 
economic objective such as maintaining competitive balance among NCAA mem-
bers’ football teams. Although the Court suggested the antitrust laws should be 
judicially construed to provide the NCAA with “ample latitude” to maintain the 
“revered tradition of amateurism in college sports” and to preserve the “student-
athlete in higher education,” collectively limiting the number of televised college 
football games did not achieve these objectives.
Similarly, in Law v. NCAA (1998), a federal appellate court held that an NCAA 
rule limiting the yearly compensation of Division 1 entry-level basketball coaches 
(i.e., “restricted-earnings” coaches) to $16,000 (a restraint on an input necessary 
to produce intercollegiate basketball) was an antitrust violation. The court found 
that the “obvious anticompetitive effects” of fixing the cost of an input necessary 
to produce intercollegiate athletics (e.g., coaching) prevented free market compe-
tition among NCAA universities for the services of coaches. In contrast to a rule 
“equaliz[ing] the overall amount of money Division 1 schools are permitted to 
spend on their basketball programs,” which would be a procompetitive means of 
promoting competitive balance, capping the salaries of one category of coaches 
would not achieve this objective. The court ruled that “cost-cutting by itself is not 
a valid procompetitive justification” for price fixing, although market competition 
would lead to higher coaching salaries without this restraint. The coaches ulti-
mately won a jury verdict of $22.3 million, which was increased to $66.9 million 
in mandatory treble damages. The NCAA subsequently settled the case for $54.5 
million in damages and approximately $20 million in attorneys’ fees and costs to 
plaintiffs’ attorneys.
In contrast, courts have relied upon the “amateur/education” model of inter-
collegiate athletics to reject antitrust challenges to NCAA eligibility rules by 
student-athletes participating in highly commercialized sports such as Division 1 
FBS football and men’s basketball. For example, in Banks v. NCAA (1992), a fed-
eral appellate court held that the NCAA’s “no agent” rule (a student-athlete loses 
eligibility to participate in all intercollegiate sports if he agrees to be represented 
by an agent) and its “no draft” rule (a student-athlete loses his amateur eligibility 
in a particular sport such as NFL football if he asks to be placed on a professional 
league’s draft list for the sport) do not violate the antitrust laws. The court concluded 
that both rules legitimately preserve the amateur nature of intercollegiate athletics, 
and that the “no draft” rule achieves the precompetitive objective of maintaining 
“the clear line of demarcation between college and professional football.”
Other courts also have disregarded the commercialized nature of Division 1 
FBS football and men’s basketball by ruling that NCAA rules seeking to maintain 
the “amateur” nature of intercollegiate athletics are essentially per se legal for pur-
poses of antitrust law. This judicial view appears based on the unproven assumption 
that the significant popularity and commercial success of intercollegiate athletics 
is primarily attributable to this self-serving NCAA characterization, thereby dem-
onstrating their responsiveness to consumer demand as required by antitrust law. 
Thus, a broad range of NCAA rules to preserve amateurism (e.g., prohibiting any 
price competition among universities or payment of fair market wages for their 
athletic services or the receipt of athletics-related pecuniary benefits from nonfa-
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mily third parties) are legal regardless of any adverse effects on student-athletes’ 
economic interests.
In Board of Regents, the Supreme Court observed that “[t]he NCAA is an 
association of schools that compete against each other to attract television revenues, 
not to mention fans and athletes.” Scholarly commentary generally has been very 
critical of lower court cases such as Banks for inappropriately presuming that NCAA 
amateurism rules are a noncommercial restraint not subject to antitrust scrutiny or 
a predominantly procompetitive form of internal regulation necessary to produce 
intercollegiate athletics (Lazaroff, 2007; Mitten, 1995). One scholar has asserted: 
“Courts should abandon anachronistic precedent based on unrealistic ideals of the 
‘amateur’ nature of ‘big-time’ college athletics and develop a principled antitrust 
jurisprudence more consistent with the economic realities of college sports in the 
21st century” (Mitten, 2000). Thus, rather than relying on an outdated amateur/
education model to reach a contrary conclusion, courts should characterize NCAA 
amateurism rules as restraints on economic competition among universities for 
student-athletes’ services, which should be subject to rigorous antitrust scrutiny 
under the Board of Regents rule of reason framework.
Because of NCAA rules prohibiting any price competition for student-athletes’ 
services, universities incur artificially reduced “labor” costs to produce sports such 
as Division 1 FBS football and men’s basketball and garner economic rent. These 
cost savings in turn are used to fund socially desirable objectives (e.g., subsidizing 
the costs of producing female and male intercollegiate sports that do not generate 
net revenues) or undesirable ones (e.g., paying exorbitant annual salaries in excess 
of $1 million to head coaches in revenue generating sports) (Rascher and Schwarz, 
2000). In addition, NCAA amateurism rules have the unintended consequence of 
contributing to the athletic arms’ race by encouraging inefficient nonprice competi-
tion for student-athletes’ services.
Recently, two different groups of former student-athletes have brought class 
action antitrust litigation against the NCAA in an effort to obtain a share of the 
revenues generated by their playing abilities and fame than historically has been per-
mitted under NCAA rules. In O’Bannon v. NCAA (2009), the plaintiffs alleged that 
the NCAA’s member universities and others collectively refused to permit former 
Division 1 basketball players and FBS football players to share in the multimillion 
dollar revenues from the sale of products incorporating their likenesses—even after 
their intercollegiate athletics eligibility ended—in violation of the antitrust laws. 
This case currently is pending in a California federal court.
In White v. NCAA (2006), a group of former Division I-A football and Division 
I basketball players asserted that an NCAA rule limiting the maximum value of their 
football and basketball scholarships to the value of tuition, fees, room and board, 
and books (which is approximately $2,500 to $3,000 less than the full annual cost 
of attending college) violates antitrust law. The complaint was carefully drafted 
in an effort to avoid the NCAA’s defense that this rule is necessary to preserve 
the amateur nature of intercollegiate athletics. Although the court ruled that plain-
tiffs’ complaint sufficiently alleged an anticompetitive agreement among NCAA 
member universities to fix the economic value of their athletic scholarships, this 
case subsequently was settled before trial. The settlement terms required the NCAA 
to make available a total of $218 million to Division 1 institutions to provide aid 
to current student-athletes with financial and/or academic needs; to establish a $10 
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million fund to reimburse plaintiffs’ future education expenses; to permit Division 
1 institutions to provide student-athletes with insurance for sport-related injuries 
and year-round health insurance; and to consider legislation permitting multiyear 
student-athlete scholarships and financial aid through graduation to student-athletes 
who no longer qualify for athletic-based aid.
Despite the historical judicial refusal to apply antitrust law to NCAA restraints 
that adversely affect student-athletes’ economic interests, White and O’Bannon 
illustrate that the potential recovery of mandatory treble damages and attorneys’ fees 
creates significant incentives for class action antitrust litigation against the NCAA. 
The risk of potential significant liability if plaintiffs prevail on the merits of their 
antitrust claims creates a strong NCAA incentive to reach a monetary settlement, 
which only resolves the immediate problem by making a one-time wealth transfer 
providing only short term, limited additional economic benefits to some student-
athletes. But a settlement does not remedy the underlying problems giving rise to 
student-athletes’ antitrust claims or preclude future antitrust litigation by others, 
the risk of which may inhibit NCAA internal reform to ensure that the revenues 
generated by commercialized sports more effectively further a university’s academic 
mission and student-athletes’ welfare.
Effective NCAA internal governance of commercialized intercollegiate athlet-
ics requires uniform rules and enforcement, which are necessarily the product of 
agreements and collective decision-making among NCAA member institutions, 
thereby inviting antitrust challenges under §1 of the Sherman Act. However, antitrust 
law is prohibitory in nature and is not well-suited to externally regulating NCAA 
internal governance of intercollegiate athletics, particularly rules and agreements 
that define this unique brand of athletic competition and the permissible scope of a 
university’s relationship with its student-athletes. Moreover, a piecemeal approach 
by way of antitrust litigation that merely considers the legality of the particular 
challenged restraint (which may result in judicial invalidation of some NCAA rules 
with socially desirable effects) will not effectively solve macro, systemic problems 
inherent in the production of commercialized intercollegiate athletics by institu-
tions of higher education. The primary actual and potential problems caused by this 
blend of athletics and academics are an overemphasis on winning and generating 
sports-related revenues; a misallocation of scare university resources to the athletic 
department; subordination of higher education academic values to the forces of 
commercialization; and student-athletes’ inability to realize the educational benefits 
of the quid pro quo for providing playing services.
We propose that Congress provide the NCAA and its member institutions 
with immunity from antitrust liability under §1 of the Sherman Act (but not §2 of 
the Sherman Act, which prohibits monopolization and attempted monopolization) 
conditioned upon the adoption and implementation of several targeted external 
reforms to ensure that 21st century intercollegiate athletics furthers legitimate 
higher education objectives, provides student-athletes with the full benefits of 
their bargain, and enhances the likelihood they will obtain a college education that 
maximizes their future career opportunities other than playing professional sports. 
By eliminating the threat of potential antitrust liability under §1 of the Sherman 
Act, this limited exemption would enable the NCAA and its member institutions to 
adopt internal reforms that prevent intercollegiate athletics from crossing the line 
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between a primarily educational to a commercial endeavor; enhance the academic 
integrity of intercollegiate athletics; promote more competitive balance in intercol-
legiate sports competition; require university fiscal responsibility rather than an 
athletics arms race; and limit unbridled market competition for inputs necessary 
to produce intercollegiate athletics such as coaches.
Proposed Conditional Antitrust Immunity and Potential 
Beneficial Effects
We recommend that a new federal law immunizing the NCAA and its member 
institutions from antitrust liability under §1 of the Sherman Act be titled the “Myles 
Brand Student-Athlete Education and Welfare Act” in honor of former NCAA 
President Myles Brand, who died on September 16, 2009. A philosophy profes-
sor, Brand was the first university president to serve as NCAA president. He was 
a strong proponent of commercialized intercollegiate athletics who believed that 
they are an integral part of higher education, but his advocacy for NCAA reforms 
to better integrate athletics and academics and to enhance student-athletes’ educa-
tional experiences and welfare was equally vigorous.
Our proposed antitrust immunity would be conditioned upon certain require-
ments that the NCAA and/or its member institutions must satisfy to ensure that 
commercialized intercollegiate athletics are primarily an educational endeavor 
and that student-athletes in sports that generate net revenues receive valuable 
educational benefits in exchange for their playing services. The following are 
some possible requirements that could be imposed as conditions of our proposed 
antitrust immunity:
 1)  At least a four-year athletic scholarship that covers the full annual cost of 
college attendance (which may be taken away only for failing to meet minimum 
academic requirements, engaging in misconduct, or voluntarily choosing to 
discontinue playing a sport) with tuition funding for a fifth or sixth year of 
college education if necessary to complete a bachelor’s degree provided the 
student-athlete is in good academic standing when his or her intercollegiate 
athletics ability is exhausted. Providing these additional benefits would appear 
to have a strong potential for increasing the college graduation rates of Division 
1 FBS football and men’s basketball student-athletes. A recent analysis of 
Federal Graduation Rate data evidences that “student-athletes graduate (within 
6 years) at higher or similar rates than do their nonathletic counterparts.” (Kane, 
Leo, and Holleran, 2008, p. 101). College graduates generally earn more 
income during their working career than those who have not earned their degree 
(Marburger and Hogshead-Makar, 2003), so it is important for student-athletes 
who play football or basketball to graduate from college because of the very 
low likelihood they will earn a living playing these sports professionally.
 2)  Free medical care or health insurance for all sports-related injuries plus 
extension of the injured student-athlete’s scholarship for a period of time 
equal to the time he is medically unable to attend class due to injury. This 
is an important benefit because the NCAA currently permits but does not 
require its member institutions to provide medical care or health insurance 
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for sports-related injuries. In addition, courts generally hold that student-
athletes, including those that participate in net revenue generating sports, are 
not “employees” entitled to recover worker’s compensation benefits for these 
injuries.
 3)  Mandatory remedial assistance and tutoring for entering student-athletes whose 
indexed academic credentials are below a certain percentile (e.g., 25th) for their 
university’s freshman class. The NCAA’s Academic Progress Rate system that 
holds universities accountable for their students-athletes’ collective academic 
performance and imposes penalties for deficiencies currently provides an 
incentive to voluntarily provide these services, but mandating such assistance 
likely would enhance the academic performance of individual students-athletes 
most at risk for not succeeding academically.
 4)  The creation of a postgraduate scholarship program administered by the 
NCAA and funded by a certain percentage of the total net revenues generated 
by intercollegiate football and men’s basketball (and perhaps other sports), 
including the sales of merchandise incorporating aspects of student-athletes’ 
persona (e.g., team jerseys with numbers identifying popular individual 
players). Because the collective efforts of all participating student-athletes, 
including those who are less prominent or talented, are necessary to produce 
each of these sports and contribute to an individual player’s commercial 
popularity, all of them should have the opportunity to qualify for educational 
benefits funded by the commercial exploitation of publicity rights.
There is justification for providing greater educational benefits to student-
athletes playing net revenue generating sports such as Division 1 men’s basketball 
and FBS football. One legal scholar observes that student-athletes who participate 
in major college basketball and football “are doing something special for their 
schools” by providing the university with a vital link to alumni, bringing together 
diverse constituencies, and creating contagious euphoria. He asserts that “[t]hose 
who provide the occasions for collective euphoria are making a unique contribu-
tion to the [university] community and deserve to be recognized for it” (Wheeler, 
2004 p. 229).
In attempting to discern why graduation rates for student-athletes in Division 
1 men’s basketball and FBS football historically have been below male graduation 
rates for the general student body, other scholars suggest one plausible explanation: 
“coaches in men’s basketball and football at this level demand more of them, in 
terms of time and energy, than athletes in other programs. While this assertion is 
speculative because there is little empirical data available in this important area, it 
makes sense that coaches at this level, who are better paid and are under extreme 
pressure to win because profits are tied to winning programs, demand more of their 
players, in order to retain their position, salary and benefits” (Smith and Walker, 
2001, p. 168). They note that these student-athletes are predominantly persons of 
color whose athletic abilities generate substantial revenues that fund other intercol-
legiate sports in which the participating student-athletes are not. Smith and Walker 
contend there is “a strong argument that they are not receiving an equitable share 
of the wealth they contribute to generating” (p. 167). Because providing greater 
educational benefits to student-athletes in net revenue-generating sports such as 
men’s football and basketball is facially gender neutral, they suggest that doing 
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so may not violate Title IX gender equity laws because “this is really an equal 
pay for equal work claim, like that of women coaches who have [unsuccessfully] 
challenged the differential in compensation between themselves and coaches in 
men’s sports” (p. 197).
Antitrust immunity could also be conditioned upon adoption of some of Profes-
sor Colombo’s foregoing proposals, particularly requiring that a certain percentage 
of the net revenues from sports such as football and men’s basketball be used to 
fund and expand participation opportunities for student-athletes in sports that do 
not generate net revenues, or requiring the NCAA and its member universities to 
provide detailed information concerning their athletic department finances using 
standardized accounting methods. Some members of Congress may insist on 
conditioning antitrust immunity on the dismantling of the current Division 1 FBS 
system, which favors universities in Bowl Championship Series conferences, and 
the establishment of a national championship playoff system in which all universi-
ties with Division 1 FBS football teams have an equal opportunity to participate.
Congressionally provided antitrust immunity from §1 of the Sherman Act 
would enable the NCAA and its member universities to pursue important socially 
desirable objectives, some of which otherwise would violate the antitrust laws. For 
example, NCAA legislation to limit the athletics’ arms race by imposing annual 
or multiyear per sport aggregate spending caps or limits on certain expenditures 
(e.g., coaches’ salaries) could be adopted for the different levels of intercollegiate 
athletics competition (e.g., Division I, II, and III). The Law case currently limits 
NCAA member institutions’ collective ability to control escalating university 
expenditures on intercollegiate athletics costs, which in recent years have increased 
at a rate two to three times more than other higher education expenditures and 
increasingly require universities to financially subsidize their athletic departments. 
Antitrust immunity also would facilitate universities’ ability to maintain or increase 
intercollegiate athletics participation opportunities in women’s sports and men’s 
nonrevenue sports by subsidizing the costs of their production from net revenues 
generated by other sports (primarily men’s basketball and football) without fear 
of antitrust litigation.
Conclusion
Legend has it that King Canute I was the ancient monarch who stood on the ocean 
shore and commanded the tide not to come in—not surprisingly, his effort failed. 
Similarly, the commercialization of intercollegiate athletics is an inevitable market 
response to our nation’s strong cultural passion for sports competition. It is equally 
inevitable that college and university leaders would seek to use intercollegiate 
athletics as a means of achieving other legitimate institutional objectives. Because 
intercollegiate athletics are an integral part of institutions of higher education, 
the revenues generated by university athletic departments should continue to be 
exempt from federal taxation. It is, however, necessary to ensure that the increasing 
commercialization of intercollegiate athletics does not conflict with the academic 
missions of universities or interfere with student-athletes’ educational opportunities. 
Our proposed solution is that Congress should provide the NCAA and its member 
universities with a limited exemption from the federal antitrust laws as a means of 
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implementing targeted reforms to ensure that intercollegiate athletics are primar-
ily an educational endeavor rather than commercialized quasi-professional sports.
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